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Abstract 
Since October 1979,  market interest-rate movements  have been  frequent and 
large.  Over  the same  time period,  for a  variety of reasons,  competition has 
intensified in  both bank  loan and  deposit markets.  These  developments have 
changed the benefits and costs of various types of asset/liability management 
strategies or a1  ternatively a  financial institution'  s  level of interest-rate 
risk exposure.  In this study,  the rate-sensitivity postures of a  sample  of 
holding companies  are examined  over  the 1977  to  1983  interval to  determine 
whether  and  how  asset/liability management  strategies changed  after October 
1979.  In  general,  the evidence  suggests  that holding companies  reduced  their 
exposure  to rate risk in  the immediate post-October 1979  period.  However, 
this change  does  not appear  to have been permanent.  The  data show  a reversal 
of this pattern at  a  number  of companies  in  1982  and 1983. 
I.  Introduction 
Changes  in  market interest rates have been  relatively frequent and large 
recently,  particularly since October 1979,  when  the Federal  Reserve  adopted  a 
new  procedure for monetary  control.  The  new  approach placed greater emphasis 
on  the supply  of bank  reserves  and  less emphasis  on  confining short-term 
fluctuations in  the federal  funds rate.'  As  a  result,  the federal  fundsrate 
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standard  deviation of  the quarter-to-quarter change  in the commercial  paper 
rate was  79  basis points over  the 11-quarter  period before the fourth quarter 
of  1979.  Over  the ensuing  9 quarters it increased  to 492  basis points.  This 
increase  in variabil i ty has  deeply  concerned  bank  managers  (and  a1 so bank 
analysts,  investors,  and  regulators) ,  because  sharp,  unanticipated changes  in 
market  rates can  produce  undesirable changes  in  a banking organization '  s  net 
interest margi n  and,  thus,  its profi tabil i  ty and  market  Val ue.  Whether 
market-rate gyrations adversely affected a particular institutions  '  s 
performance  after October 1979  depends  upon  the rate-sensitivity posture 
maintained by  the organization during this time. 
11.  The  Gap  as an  Index  of  Rate Sensitivity 
The  net interest margin  (NIM)  impact of  a given  change  in  market  rates 
occurring over  some  relatively short time  period  (90 days,  for example) 
generally depends  upon  the type and  size of  any  banking  organization's 
cumul ative rate-sensi  tivi  ty gap  re1 ative to its vol ume  of  averaging earning 
 asset^.^  This gap  is defined  as the difference between  the institution's 
volume  of  rate-sensi  tive assets  (RSAs)  and  its volume  of  rate-sensi  tive 
liabilities (RSLs).  Any  asset or liability that can  be  repriced at  some  time 
in the specified  interval  is classified as rate-sensitive and  is included  in 
the respective total.  Symbol ical  ly,  this re1 ationship can  be  expressed as 
fol1  ows: 
CHNIM  =  $=*  CHR, 
AE  A 
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CHNIM  =  NIMt  -  NIMt-l, 
$GAP  = RSA  - RSL, 
AEA  =  total average  earning assets,  and 
CHR  =  RT  -  RT-l , 
where 
R  is  some  representative market rate of interest. 
Given a relatively short time horizon,  if  an  organization's volume  of RSAs 
exceeds  its  volume  of RSLs,  or it  has  a positive gap,  changes  in  its  margin 
should be  positively correlated with changes  in  market rates over  that 
interval.  The  reason  for this relationship is  that more  of the institution's 
assets than liabilities have  rates that change  as market rates change.  So, 
given rising market rates,  interest income  shoul d increase more  than interest 
expense,  causing the organization's  net interest income  and NIM to rise as 
we1 1.  The  1  arger the gap  re1  ative to an  institution'  s total volume  of average 
earning assets,  the 1  arger the NIM impact of a given increase in  rates. 
Obviously,  given a positive gap,  an organization's  NIM falls along with market 
rates. 
Conversely,  given a relatively short time period,  changes  in  an 
institution  '  s NIM are negatively correl  ated with market-rate changes if 
it  has  a negative gap  (RSLs > RSAs).  Again,  the 1  arger the gap  relative to 
total average  earning assets,  the larger the rate impact.  The  NIM of 
organizations that have  a zero gap  or are balanced  (RSAs  =  RSLs)  should not 
vary markedly  in  response  to changes  in  market rates. 5 
It should be noted that the so-called typical relationships between  bank 
gap positions,  NIMs,  and market rates described above may  weaken  or even 
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disappear as the hypothesized  time  horizon  is lengthened.6  That  is, the NIM 
impact of  a  rate change  assumed  to occur over a longer time  interval  (1 year 
for example)  might  not be  unambiguously  re1 ated to an  institution 's 12-month 
cumulative gap  position.  One  reason  these relationships break  down  is that 
any  given  cumulative  long-term  gap  position is consistent with a wide  variety 
of  different short-term incremental  (that is, non-cumul ative  )  gap  positions. 
The  ultimate NIM  impact  generated  by  some  given  change  in rates assumed  to 
occur  over a 12-month  period will  depend  on  the distinctive pattern of 
short-term gaps  at each  individual  institution.  It  will  also depend  on  how 
the rates on  the various  types of  assets and  1  iabil i ties already on  the 
institution's books  respond  to the given  change  in market  rates, on  how  the 
short-term gap  positions are reshaped over  the period as various assets and 
1  iabil i ties mature,  and  on  other factors as well. 7 
I I  I.  Asset/Liabi 1  i ty Management  Strategy 
The  discussion above  suggests  that bank  management  could  have  elected to 
pursue  one  of  two  asset/liability management  strategies in the volatile rate 
environment  that prevai 1  ed  after October 1979.  Management  could  have 
attempted  to pursue  an  anticipatory gapping  strategy (creating positive gaps 
prior to  expected  rate increases and  negative  gaps  prior to expected  rate 
decl i nes  1,  or it  coul d have  adopted  and  maintained a zero-gap  position during 
this time. 
The first strategy implies  that management  is  willing to assume  more  risk 
to earn higher expected  returns,  because anticipatory gapping  is potentially 
disastrous if rate expectations are not realized.  The  risks and  potential 
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returns from  such  a strategy depend  on  the size of  the gap  opened.  A  zero-gap 
strategy implies a choice of  lower  expected  returns in exchange  for lower  risk. 
Management's  choice of  a strategy might  be  influenced  by  its degree of 
satisfaction with  the organization's NIM  at the outset of  any  given  period, 
its appetite for risk,  and  its ability to forecast interest rates.8  Another 
important factor is  management's  abil i ty to expeditiously a1 ter the 
organization's  gap  position,  given  a particular rate out1  ook. 9 
If management  is  dissatisfied with its organization's  NIM  level,  if it  has 
an  appetite for risk,  if it  forecasts rates with confidence,  and  if it  can 
reshape  the organization's bal ance  sheet in any  desi red  fashion,  then 
anticipatory gapping  strategy becomes  attractive and  is likely to be  pursued. 
On  the other hand,  if an  institution's management  is content with the current 
margin  level , strongly disl i  kes  taking risks,  has  1  i ttl  e confidence  in its 
ability to forecast rates,  and  is unable  to a1 ter the organization's gap 
position easily, a zero-gap  strategy appears more  attractive. 
The  shift by  the Federal  Reserve  to a monetary  pggregate  targeting 
procedure  in October 1979,  in combination  with several  other forces,  radically 
a1 tered the operating environment  of  banks  (and of  a1 1 financial 
institutions)  .  These  developments  affected the potential  risks and  returns of 
both  kinds of  asset11  iabil  ity management  strategies and  so  may  have caused 
management  to reevaluate,  and  perhaps alter, the strategy previously  pursued. 
In  particular,  the shift to a monetary  targeting procedure caused  both 
short-term and  long-term interest rates to change  more  frequently and  by  much 
larger amounts  than  they  had  in the past.  Irregular unprecedented  movements 
in  rates make  accurate rate forecasting more  difficult and  anticipatory 
gapping  increasingly risky. 
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At  the same  time,  intra-  and  interindustry competition were  becoming more 
intense for all firms supplying financial  services.  Regulatory barriers to 
pricing and  product competition were  being eliminated or circumvented.  This 
increase in  competition put pressure on  the margins of banks  and  all other 
financial institutions.  Management  might be  induced to gap  more  aggressively 
under  such  circumstances  in  an  attempt to delay,  or even  reduce,  margin 
shrinkage  that stemmed  from deregulation. 
This study represents an  attempt to determine whether  and  how  the gap- 
management  strategies pursued by a nonrandom sample  of 41  regional  bank 
holding companies  1  ocated in  11  different states changed  after October 1979. 
IV.  Evidence  of Rate  Sensi tivi  tv 
A  Direct Measure  of the Rate-Sensitivity Gap 
From 1979  to  1982,  only a limited amount of information on  the rate- 
sensitivity characteristics of holding company  assets and  1  iabil i  ties was 
disc1  osed  in  pub1  ished annual  reports.  It  is  possible to  construct only 1 gap 
-  measure--a  year-end,  12-month  gap  measure--for  holding companies  from 
available data.  Even  this gap  measure  requires a judgment about the rate- 
sensi ti  vi  ty characteri  sti  cs of certai  n bal  ance-sheet i  tems.  Thus,  the gap 
measures  used here,  like any  such measures,  are relatively crude indexes of 
each  company's  exposure  to  market-rate changes.  Examination of these measures 
across companies  and  changes  in  these measures  over  time indicate whether  and 
how  holding companies  a1  tered their rate-sensi  tivi  ty postures  since 1979. 
Year-end 1979,  1980,  1981,  and 1982  estimated gap  figures for the sample 
companies  are reported in  appendix A.  Details concerning the construction of 
these measures  are incl  uded  in  this appendix  as  we1 1  .  The  data in  appendix  A 
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12-month  gaps  at year-end 1979.  The  mean  1979  gap  ratio for the sample 
companies  was  -5.9  percent. 
Little  evidence of defensive balance-sheet adjustment  is  apparent  from 
these  gap  measures  through year-end 1980.  The  number  of companies  with 
negative gaps  actually increased to  36.  The  mean  gap  hit  -12.8  percent at 
year-end.  The  mean  absolute value of the gap  rose from 8.3  percent in  1979  to 
14.4  percent in  1980,  indicating that the companies  generally did not reduce 
the size of their gap  position (and so  their exposure to rate risk) during 
1  980. 
However,  a  reversal of the trend toward greater 1  iabil  ity sensitivity was 
evident by  the end  of 1981.  This might reflect an  attempt by banks  to take 
advantage  of an  expected rise in  rates.  On  the other hand,  it  might indicate 
a  general  desire to  move  in  the direction of a  zero gap,  given the 
unpredictable rate movements  during this period.  In  this case,  the mean  1981 
gap  position was  -8.2  percent.  A  formal  test indicated that the difference 
between  the 1981  and 1980 mean  gap  ratios was  highly significant.  The  change 
in  the gap  was  positive at  33  companies. 
The  data suggest  that companies  generally reduced  their interest-rate risk 
exposure during 1981.  The  absolute value of the gap  declined at  32  of the 
sample  companies,  and  the mean  absolute value of the 1-year gap  measures  fell 
by roughly 5  percentage  points to 9.8  percent. 
The  general movement  in  the direction of asset sensitivity continued 
during 1982.  Thi  rty-ei  ght companies  exhi  bi  ted positive gap  changes. 
Twenty-one  of the sample  companies  had positive one-year  gaps  at the end  of 
this year.  The  mean  1982  gap  position was  -0.1  percent.  However,  the 
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1982  and 1981  mean  gap  measures  is  again statistically significant. 
The  absol  ute val  ue  gap  measures  indicate that hol  ding companies  general ly 
were  unwilling to bear  as much  rate risk as  in  the past.  The  mean  absolute 
value of the gap  again declined to 6.3  percent and  was  be1  ow  the 1979  1  eve1 . 
The  absolute value of the gaps  of  32  companies  was  lower in  1982  than it  had 
been  in  1981.  Twenty-five of the companies  reduced the absolute value of 
their gaps  in  both of the two  preceding years. 
Indirect Rate-Sensitivity Gap  Measures 
NIM beta.  As  noted in  section 11,  relatively long-term gap measures  (1  ike 
12-month measures)  provide only 1  imi  ted insight on  hol  ding company  exposure  to 
rate changes  occurring over  shorter intervals,  such  as  a month  or a quarter. 
Determination of this exposure  requires detailed knowledge  of each 
institution's shorter-term gap  positions--its 30- or 90-day  gap. 
Few  holding companies  published the data necessary  to  construct such 
short-term gap  measures  over  the 1979  to  1982  interval.  However,  it  is 
possible to obtain two  types of estimates of holding company  short-term gap 
positions using non-bal ance-sheet data  that are avail  able. 
The  correlation between  changes  in  an  organization's  NIM and changes  in 
market rates occurring over relatively short time periods generally depends 
upon  its  short-term  gap  position.  A positive correlation indicates it  has  a 
positive short-term gap;  a negative correlation,  a negative short-term gap;  a 
zero correlation,  a zero short-term gap.  This suggests  that the regression 
coefficient obtained by regressing the short-run change  in  a hol  ding company 's 
NIM on  the corresponding change  in  a representative market rate of interest 
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can be  used as  an  estimate of its  short-term gap  position.10  We  will refer 
to this coefficient here as  a company's  NIM beta.  The  sign of the estimated 
coefficient indicates the nature of its  gap--a  positive coefficient,  a 
positive gap  and  vice-versa.  The  statistical significance and  absol  ute val  ue 
of the coefficient provide insight to the size of the gap;  a significant large 
coefficient imp1  ies a 1  arge-gap  position.  An  insignificant coefficient 
suggests  that an  institution is  roughly balanced. 
Quarterly net-interest margin data were  used  to estimate such  a regression 
for each  of the sample  companies  for several  subperiods  from the first  quarter 
of 1977  to the third quarter of 1983.  The  regression results are detailed in 
appendix  B. 
A1 though a 1  arge proportion of the companies  had negative  1  -year gaps  in 
1979,  re1  atively few  (1  6) exhibited negative regression coefficients from the 
third  quarter of  1977  to the third quarter of 1979.  Just two  of these 
companies  had coefficients significant at  the 10 percent 1  eve1  (2-tail test). 
Twenty-five of the companies  had  positive coefficients,  suggesting positive 
short-term gaps.  However,  only two  of these positive coefficients were 
si  gni  ficant.  The  mean  coefficient for the companies  with negative 
coefficients was  -0.0678,  and  for the companies  with positive coefficients it 
was  0.0757.  The  mean  absolute value of the coefficients for all companies  was 
0.0726  for the pre-October 1979  period. 
Coefficients obtained  from regressions estimated over  the entire period 
from the fourth quarter of 1979  to the third quarter of 1983  suggest  that 
short-term gap  position adjustments were  similar to the longer-term gap 
changes  noted above.  In  particular,  a movement  in  the direction of asset 
sensitivity is  evident after 1979.  A  total of 31  companies  exhibit 
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companies  had  negative coefficients,  with just one  being  significant. 
Further,  the regression  results suggest that companies  generally maintained 
small er short-term gap  positions in the post-October 1979  interval . 
The  coefficient for companies  with positive coefficients is 0.0353;  for 
the companies  with negative coefficients,  it  is -0.0219.  The  absolute value 
of  the coefficient declined  at  33 of  the sample companies,  and  the mean 
absolute value of  the coefficient is roughly  one-half  what it  was  in the 
pre-October 1979  period:  0.0320  as opposed  to 0.0726. 
However,  if the  post-October 1979  period  is broken  into two  subperiods of 
roughly equal  1  ength  (from the fourth quarter of  1979  to the fourth quarter of 
1981  and  from  the first quarter of  1982  to the third quarter of  1983), the 
regression  results suggest  short-term  rate-sensitivity adjustments  not 
apparent  when  the entire period is examined. 
The  results indicate that most  companies  (36) had  positive short-term gaps 
in the first post-October 1979  subperiod.  Eighteen  of  the 36  regression 
coefficients are significant.  This  presumably  reflects the expectation  that 
short-term rates would  rise over this interval.  Just one  of  the five negative 
coefficients is significant.  The  mean  coefficient for the companies with 
positive coefficients was  0.0396,  as opposed  to -0.0382  for the companies  with 
negative coefficients.  The  mean  absolute value of  all coefficients was  0.0394. 
Estimated coefficients for the second  subperiod suggest the short-term 
gaps  of most  companies  turned  negative  toward  the end  of  1981.  This may 
reflect deliberate adjustments  to take advantage of  an  expected decline in 
short-term  rates or  an  inabil i ty to offset 1  iabil  ity composition changes  dueto 
the introduction of  money  market  deposit accounts  (MMDAS)  .' ' Thi  rty-six of 
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are significant.  The  mean  of  the negative coefficients was  -0.0813.  The  mean 
of  the positive coefficient was  0.0551.  The  mean  absol ute value of  a1 1 
coefficients was  0.0782.  The  latter is well  above  the corresponding  value for 
the 1979  to 1981  period,  indicating that companies  were  generally will  ing to 
assume more  i nterest-rate ri  sk after 1981 . 
Debt  index  beta.  It is possible  to derive another measure  of 
i nterest-rate sensitivity for pub1 icly traded bank  holding companies  from 
stock market  data.  Essenti a1 ly this is accompl i shed  by  regressing the 
periodic rate of  return on  a holding company's  stock on  some  type of 
i nterest-rate index  and  some  broad  stock-market index  (which has  been 
orthogonalized with respect to the interest-rate index  to eliminate 
correl  ati  on  between  the two  i ndependent  vari  abl es  ) .  12 
'  A  variety of  interest-rate indexes have  been  employed  in previous 
research.  In  most  studies,  the rate of  return on  a debt  instrument or bond 
index  has  been  used;  this is the approach  taken  in this study.'  A1  though 
several  alternatives were  employed,  the  results reported  are from  regressions 
where  the rate of  return on  an  index  of  high-grade  corporate bonds was  used  as 
the  interest-rate index. 14 
The  estimated coefficient on  the bond  index  return variable in the 
regression equation  is  an  estimate of  the market's view  of  the 
rate-sensi  tivi  ty posture of  a holding company.  It is termed  the --  debt index 
beta  in this study.  Since bond  returns move  inversely  with interest rates,  a 
positive significant coefficient on  the bond  return variable indicates that 
the company's market  value decl ines when  market  rates rise.  This suggests 
that the market  considers the company  to be  1  i  abi 1  i ty-sensi ti  ve  (RSL >  RSA) . 
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of  companies  with relatively large positive gaps  should  not decline 
significantly as rates rise,  because  their profi  tabil i ty should move  in tandem 
with market  rates.  Thus,  such  companies  should exhibit negative or 
insignificant positive debt  index  return coefficients.  15 
The  regression  resul ts for the sample  companies appear  in appendix  C. 
Monthly  rate-of-return data were  used.  Again,  the regressions are estimated 
for a variety of  subperiods  from  January 1977  to September 1983. 
The  mean  bond  index  return coefficient,  or mean  debt  index  beta, was 
0.0085  for the sample  companies  in the pre-October 1979  period.  Ten  of  these 
coefficients are significant at the 10  percent level  if a 2-tailed hypothesis 
test is conducted.  The  mean  coefficient for these 10  companies  was  0.0147. 
The  mean  debt index  beta coefficient was  0.0053  for the sample  companies 
when  the regressions were  estimated  for the entire post-October 1979  period. 
The  coefficients of  18 companies were  lower  for this interval  than  they were 
in the preceding period.  However,  34  of  the coefficients are significant in 
the latter period.  Thus,  the debt  index  beta  results for the entire 
post-October 1979  interval  seem  to conflict with the NIM  beta  results for the 
same  period. 
Regression  results for October 1979  to December  1981  yield a mean  debt 
index  beta coefficient of  0.0055  for all sample  companies.  The  mean 
coefficient is 0.0064  for the 29  companies  with significant coefficients. 
These  findings suggest  that many  companies were  viewed  by  the market  as 
liabil  ity-sensitive over  this period,  a1 though  the NIM  beta  findings,  and  to a 
lesser extent the long-term  gap  measures,  suggest a general  movement  in the 
direction of  asset sensitivity.  The  coefficients of  27  sampl e companies 
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were  1  ower  in  this period than they had been  before October 1979,  confirming 
the decreased willingness to bear  rate risk revealed by the other 2 measures 
for this time period. 
Results for the January 1982  to September  1983  period reveal  that the mean 
coefficient for all sample  companies  decl  ined sl  ightly to  0.0053.  However, 
the mean  debt index beta coefficient for 19  companies  with significant 
coefficients  was  0.0086--above  the value for similar companies  in  the 
preceding  time period.  Thus,  the debt index beta results do  not reflect the 
marked  shift to short-term 1  iabil i  ty sensitivity after 1981  that is  indicated 
by  the NIM beta measures. 
The  1982  to  1983  coefficients of only 18 companies  were  smaller than  in 
the previous period.  The  1982-83  coefficients of  27,  or roughly two-thirds, 
of the sample  companies  were  below  the value for the pre-October 1979 
interval.  However,  only ten companies  showed  consistent period-to-period 
declines over  the entire 1977-83  interval.  These  results confirm the 
bounce-back  (suggested by  the NIM beta measures)  in  the will  ingness of holding 
companies  to bear rate risk. 
V.  A  Comparison  of the Findings Obtained Using  the 
A1 ternative Rate-Sensi  tivi  ty Measures 
The  different measures  of rate sensitivity produce  sl  ightly different 
pictures of changes  in  holding company  gap-management strategy from 1977  to 
1983.  This point becomes  more  clear if  the three different rate-sensitivi  ty 
measures  derived for each company  are correlated with one  another across 
companies  for each  of the three sub-interval  s  examined  (see  table 1 ). 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyTab1 e 1  Correlation Coefficients 
Rate-  Debt 
sensitivity  index 
measures  NIM beta  beta 
Jan.  1977-Sept.  1979 
Oct.  1979-Dec.  1981  .271 b  -  .294b 
Jan.  1982-Sept.  1983  -.I31  -  .045 
NIM beta 
Jan.  1977-Sept.  1979 
Oct.  1979-Dec.  1981 
Jan.  1982-Sept.  1983 
a.  The  gap  measure  used  for the October 1979  to December 1981  period was  an 
average of  the 1979,  1980,  and  1981  year-end  gap  figures.  For  the January 
1982  to September 1983  interval,  the gap  measure was  the 1982 year-end  figure. 
b.  Significant at the 10 percent  level,  2-tailed test. 
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a  wide variety of shorter-term gap  positions.  Thus,  the relationship between 
a company's  12-month  gap  measure  and  the other rate-sensitivity measures  is 
not clear,  a priori  .  However,  since the 12-month  gap  is  determined by  a 
company's  sequence  of shorter-term gaps,  it  seems  reasonable  to expect to find 
a  positive correlation between  the company's  12-month  gap  and  NIM beta, 
a1 though  the correl  ati  on  mi  ght be  weak.  A  si  gni  f i  cant positive correl  ation 
was  discovered,  but only for the October 1979  to  December  1981  interval .  The 
correlations for the other intervals were  negative and  weak. 
Similarly,  the re1  ationship between  a  company's  12-month  gap  measure  and 
its  debt index beta could be  loose.  However,  a  negative correlation between 
such measures  appears more  likely than a positive one.  A  significant negative 
relationship was  detected but,  as  was  the case  above,  only for the October 
1979  to December  1981  period. 
The  relationship between  the NIM beta and  debt index beta measures  also is 
not determinate,  but a  negative relationship appears  likely.  A  negative 
correlation was  found in  only  two  of the three periods examined,  and  none  of 
the correlations is  significant. 
Each measure  does  paint a  slightly different picture of the rate- 
sensitivity posture of the sample  companies  over  this time period. 
However,  the three sets of measures  taken  together indicate that holding 
companies  generally changed  their rate-sensi  tivi  ty postures.  Prior to October 
I  1979,  the typical holding company  had a  negative long-term gap.  However,  the 
NIM beta and  debt index beta measure  results suggest  that they did not 
typically have  large negative short-term gaps  during this time period as 
well.  Changes  in  the sample  companies'  12-month  gap  and  NIM beta measures  in 
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the immediate  post-October  1979  period suggest  that companies  reacted  to the 
rate volatility in this interval  by  moving  toward  asset sensitivity.  The  NIM 
beta  results seem  to indicate that most  companies  managed  to adjust their 
short-term gap  positions quickly  in this manner.  However,  the debt index  beta 
results suggest that the market  discounted  short-term gap  adjustments and 
penalized  companies  with longer-term negative gaps.  The  general  decline  in 
the size of  all of  the rate-sensi tivity measures  indicates that most  companies 
maintained small er gap  positions during this interval . 
Results for the final  subperiod  reveal  that the rate-sensitivity trends 
first evidenced  after October 1979  generally did not continue.  The  NIM beta 
results indicate that the short-term gaps  of  many  companies  turned from 
positive to negative.  Further,  two  of  the three measures  suggest either that 
holding companies  became  more  willing to assume  interest-rate risk  in the 1982 
to 1983  period,  or that they were  forced  to do  so because of  an  inability to 
offset changes  in liability composition  that were  due  to deposit-rate 
deregulation. 
VI.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  results suggest that holding companies  did a1 ter their rate- 
sensitivity postures after October 1979.  In  the 1980  to 1981  period,  holding 
companies  generally moved  toward  asset sensitivity and  reduced  the size of 
their gap  positions.  However,  the changes  varied across companies and  do  not 
appear to have  been  permanent.  This behavior  is not  surprising  in view  of  the 
factors influencing management's  choice of  an  appropriate asset/liability 
management  strategy as identified above.  For  example,  gapping  might  have 
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appeared less risky (and so  more  attractive) as  rate volatility declined in 
1981 ,  and  the Federal  Reserve  announced  that it  would abandon  its  strict 
monetary  targeting strategy.  On  the other hand,  margin pressures may  have 
forced management  to take on more  risk to  boost expected returns.  It is  also 
possible that holding company  management  became  more  will  ing to assume  rate 
risk in  1982  and 1983,  because it  had  finally detected and  corrected perceived 
deficiencies or improved the asset11 i  abi  1 i  ty management  practices used  before 
October 1979. 
Given  that a company's  optimal  rate-sensitivity posture is  a function of 
several  factors that typically change  over  time,  it  is  not possible to 
unambiguously  determine a single correct posture  for all companies  for all 
times.  Thus,  it  is  not possible to conclude  that the adjustments evident in 
the most  recent period are inappropriate.  This implies that it  would be 
difficult to implement a system of deposit insurance pricing that ties an 
institution's premi  um  to a measure  of its i  nterest-rate risk without 
generating a variety of unintended,  perhaps  undesirable,  changes  in  bank 
behavior.  Until more  is  known  about how  banks  determine their overall risk 
exposure  and  exposure  to the various kinds of risk,  the benefits and costs 
produced by changing  the incentives for banks  to take particular types of 
risks will remain uncertain.  Given  this uncertainty,  regulatory changes  that 
affect the willingness of banks  to take risks should be  carefully  considered. 
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The  12-month  gaps  listed in table 2  were  derived  by  subtracting each 
institution's estimated total volume  of  rate-sensi  tive 1  iabil i ties (that is, 
those subject to repricing over  the ensuing 12-month  interval )  from  its 
estimated volume  of  rate-sensitive assets.  This total was  then  divided by  the 
institution's average earning  assets.  A1  1 data were  drawn  from  bank  holding 
company  annual  reports.  Total  estimated  rate-sensi  tive 1  iabil i ties were 
assumed  to be  the sum  of  1  arge-denomi nation  ($100,000) certificates of  deposit 
(CDs),  deposits  in foreign offices,  federal  funds  purchased,  securities sold 
under  agreement  to repurchase,  other debt  with an  original  maturity of  one 
year  or 1  ess, and  1  ong-term debt with a  remaining maturity of  one year.  In 
addition,  the mean  ratio of  money  market  certificates to total deposits  (less 
1  arge CDs)  for a1 1 banks  in  each  holding company's  state for each  year in the 
period was  used  as an  estimate of  the percentage of  its small-denomination 
' 
time  deposits that were  rate-sensi  tive.  This percentage  times its volume  of 
total  deposits  (1  ess 1  arge CDs)  produced  an  estimate of  rate-sensi  tive 
small -denomination  time  deposits and  was  i ncl uded  in the 1  i abi 1  i ty total . 
Total  rate-sensitive assets were  the sum  of  federal  funds  sold,  securities 
purchased  under  agreements  to resell,  investment securities with remaining 
maturity of  one  year or 1  ess,  trading account securities, floating-rate 1  oans, 
and  fixed- rate 1  oans  with  remaining  maturi ties of  one year or less. 
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Gap  1980  Company  Gap  1979  Gap  1981  Gap  1982 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm






VA-  5 
Gap  1979  Gap  1980  Gap  1981  Gap  1982 
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Corn  any  Coeff.  t-stat.  . Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  P- 
AL-  1  .0699  1.38  .0143  0.81  .0241  1.22 
AL-2  .2314  4.70"  .0372  1.72  .0547  2.93* 
AL-3  .0327  0.55  .0107  0.40  .0163  0.57 
AL-4  ,0307  0.70  .0530  2.29*  .0637  2.23" 
AL-5  -.0548  -0.82  0255  1.56  .0376  2.44" 
MA-  1  .0596  1.62  .0150  0.84  .0298  1.92* 
MO- 1  .I292  0.98  .0802  1.70  .I092  2.50* 
MO-2  -.0104  -0.25  -.0170  -0.75  -  .0343  -3.82* 
MO-3  .0901  1.02  -.0108  -0.20  .0015  0.05 
MO-4  -.0300  -0.66  .0152  0.90  .0195  0.86 
TN- 1  .0144  0.28  .0473  1.87"  .0662  5.70* 
TN-2  .0460  0.43  -.0027  -0.21  .0093  0.76 
TN-3  .0613  0.79  .0292  2.01*  .0471  3.09* 
Coeff.  t-stat. 
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Company  Coeff.  t-stat. 
VA-1  .0869  1.55 
VA-  2  .0035  0.05 
VA-3  -.0222  0.51 
VA-4  .0942  2.10" 
VA-5  .I011  1.53 
Coeff.  t-stat.  -  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  - 
- --- - 
*  Significant at the 10  percent level ,  2-tai  1 test. 
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Company  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. 








































































Best available copyAppendix  C  Regression Resul ts:  Debt  Index Betas  (Continued) 
Corn  any  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  P- 
-  -  -- 
jSi gni  ficant at  the 10 percent  1  eve1 , 2-tai  1 test. 
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1.  Although the procedure was  changed  again in  August 1982,  the emphasis  on 
reserve supply  remains  re1  atively greater than before 1979. 
2.  Bank  non-interest income  is  relatively stable and  less than operating 
expense.  Thus,  net interest earnings  are the key determinant of overall 
prof i  tabi  1 i  ty  . 
3.  A  number  of authors have made  a strong case  in  favor  of using the concept 
of duration analysis to create an  alternative index measure  of rate 
sensitivity--the so-called duration gap.  For a discussion of duration-gap 
model s,  see  Toevs  and Haney  (1  984).  While duration-gap measures  have  a number 
of attractive properties relative to periodic gap models,  they  do  have  one 
particul  arly nett1  esome  drawback--1  arge amounts  of very detai  1  ed 
asset/liability characteristic information are required to  construct them. 
This is  why  such measures  are not used  in  this study. 
4.  Actually,  precise measurement  of rate-sensitive assets and  liability 
totals is  quite complicated.  For example,  interest-rate and  principal 
payments  received must  be  considered,  prepayments  and  defaults should be 
estimated,  and  estimates of the rate-sensitive portions of liabilities without 
explicit maturities must be  obtained.  For a discussion of these  issues,  see 
the studies in  footnote 6. 
5.  This discussion and  all that follows presume  that banks  do  not hedge 
exposed  gap  positions with off-balance-sheet devices such  as  interest-rate 
futures or other techniques  such  as  interest-rate swaps.  Available evidence 
suggests  that most  banks  did not actively hedge  their gap  positions in  this 
way  from 1979  to  1982. 
6.  For an  extensive discussion of problems  and  complications involved in  gap 
model s,  see  Binder  and Li  ndqui  st (  1982 ) ,  Kaufman  (1  984),  and  especi  a1 ly  Toevs 
(1  983)  and  Toevs  and Haney  (1  984). 
7.  Again,  off-balance hedging could alter these relationships and  is  assumed 
to be  immaterial. 
8.  Management's  choice  of interest-rate risk exposure has  a direct and 
indirect impact on  the organization '  s total risk exposure,  because it 
influences other dimensions of risk.  For example,  interest-rate risk exposure 
affects an  institution's credit risk and  1  iquidity risk. 
9.  Both  strategies presume  that bank  management  is  able to exercise a 
considerable amount  of control  over  its  organization's  rate-sensi  tivity 
posture.  Real i  stical  ly  ,  desired bal  ance-sheet  adjustments  take time and  can 
be  costly.  Desired gap  adjustments may  be constrained by conflicting customer 
preferences and  competi tive pressures. 
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negotiable CD  rate was  used  as  the representative market rate. 
11.  The  MMDA  was  essentially the first  retail deposit product without a rate 
ceiling.  Financial  institutions could thus attempt to  bid funds away  from 
competitors.  However,  since this was  not possible in  the past,  customer  and 
competitor reaction to  MMDA  pricing differentials  were  unknown.  As  a result, 
prediction of inflows into MMDAs  was  subject to error,  and  inflows probably 
surprised asset/l iabil i  ty managers  at  most  institutions.  MMDAs  at  commercial 
banks  went  from zero in  November  1982  to over  $185  billion by  the end  of the 
first quarter of 1983.  Because  the maximum  nominal  maturity on  MMDAs  is  one 
month  (and  the effective maturity could be  less),  these  funds  constitute 
re1  ati  vely short-term 1  iabi  1 i  ti  es.  Large inflows may  have  resul  ted in 
undesired increases  in  1  iabil i  ty sensitivity. 
12.  See  Chance  and  Lane  (19801,  Lloyd and  Shick  (1977),  Lynge  and  Zumwal t 
(1  980),  and Fl  annery  and  James  (1  984b). 
13.  Actually,  the interest-rate index  should be  a measure  of unanticipated 
rate movements--that is,  a whi te-noise process.  Formal  statistical tests 
indicated that the index used in  this study could be  treated as  a white-noise 
process  and  so  the rate series was  not transformed in  any  way.  Flannery and 
James  (1984b)  found that their results were  not affected when  they used 
various original rate series instead of a pre-whitened series. 
14.  Specifically,  the Salomon  Brothers rate of return index  for a portfolio 
of high-grade corporate bonds  was  used  in  the regressions reported. 
15.  It is  uncertain whether asset-sensitive companies  will exhibit negative 
significant coefficients.  Some  observers have  argued that the market values 
of asset-sensitive companies  will not change  significantly as  market rates 
change,  because  the net income  of such companies  will rise and  fall in  tandem 
with market rates and,  presumably,  the rates investors use  to discount their 
cash  flow streams  of banking organizations. 
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